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I INTRODUCTION  
The International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) opined in April 2008 that:  
The financial market crisis that erupted in August 2007 has developed into the 
largest financial shock since the Great Depression, inflicting heavy damage on 
markets and institutions at the core of the financial system.1  
The financial market crisis has since infected the rest of the world economy 
resulting in a crisis of confidence, credit rationing and widespread de-leveraging 
that has had major impacts on wealth, output, trade, employment and standards 
of living across the globe. 
In April 2009, the IMF reported that ‘[t]he global financial system remains 
under severe stress as the crisis broadens to include households, corporations, 
and the banking sectors in both advanced and emerging market countries.’2 The 
crisis has also impacted pension and superannuation funds and insurance 
companies. The IMF estimates that losses from the financial crisis could reach 
US$4 trillion.  
In Australia, superannuation assets decreased to A$1.05 trillion in the 12 
months ending December 2008 – a decrease of nearly 15 per cent.3 The 
aggregate-listed share price of Australian banks from July 2007 to March 2009 
                                                 
*  Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales and Consultant, Clayton Utz.  B Com 
(Hons), M Com (Hons), LLB (UNSW) and LLM (UC-Berkeley).  Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales and Member of the New York Bar.   
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1  IMF, World Economic Outlook: Housing and the Business Cycle (April 2008) 4. At that time several 
major bankruptcies, including Lehman Brothers, Circuit City and Chrysler and bailouts for large financial 
institutions such as AIG and Citigroup, had yet to occur. 
2  IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring Systemic 
Risks (April 2009) xi-xii. See also ‘The global financial system is facing a once-in-a-century event, where 
credit risks have risen to extremely high levels’: at 3. 
3  Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (‘APRA’), Quarterly Superannuation Performance 
(December 2008) APRA <http://www.apra.gov.au/media-releases/09_06.cfm> at 25 May 2009. 
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fell approximately 40 per cent.4 In the six months ending  December 2008, the 
value of equities held by Australian superannuation funds fell 38 per cent.5 
The ramifications of the global financial crisis (‘GFC’), perhaps to be known 
in history as the Great Recession or the Second Great Depression, has led to 
questions about its causes.6 The search for a single cause is likely to be in vain; 
rather, the focus should be on issues of initial drivers, forces that exacerbated 
these drivers and factors that have operated to prolong the crisis.  
This article seeks to examine the issue of causes in three parts. Part II 
provides a factual account of what has occurred up to June 2009. Part III 
examines the crisis by highlighting a number of key underlying themes that arise 
from the factual account. An appreciation of these themes assists in 
understanding the legal and regulatory problems that the crisis has brought to 
light, which are discussed in Part IV. 
This article takes the approach that those that fail to learn from history are 
doomed to repeat it.7 A causal analysis thus has merit in terms of preventing a 
recurrence of those events that led to the GFC. However, caution must 
accompany a discussion of causes. Any causal analysis, especially of 
socioeconomic phenomena such as economics and financial markets, is likely to 
simplify what is a complex matter. We are still very close to the events under 
study and developments continue to arise on a daily basis with revised stimulus 
packages and recriminations over corporate collapses. Perfect vision is possible 
only with hindsight, and the causes and contributors to the financial crisis will 
reveal themselves in a more complete form over time. Nonetheless, the dramatic 
effect of the GFC on the world’s financial system and implications for 




To understand the causes of the credit crunch and GFC, it is necessary to start 
with the events that led to the housing market bubble and subprime lending in the 
United States and how the bursting of that bubble spread to other sectors of the 
US economy – most notably the financial services sector – and then to the rest of 
the world. It is a story of contagion, interdependence, interconnection and co-
variance: how the American Dream became the global nightmare.  
The GFC has its roots in the US subprime mortgage market. Subprime 
mortgages are loans to borrowers who have a poor credit history and so are likely 
                                                 
4  Reserve Bank of Australia (‘RBA’), Financial Stability Review (March 2009) Graph 2. 
5  Ibid Table 6. 
6  For a comparison of the Great Depression and the GFC see Kevin Rudd, ‘A Strategy for Sustainable 
Economic Recovery – the Role of the G20’, (Speech delivered at the Hotel Adlon Kempinski, Berlin, 7 
July 2009).  
7  ‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it’: George Santayana, The Life of 
Reason; or, The Phases of Human Progress: Reason in Common Sense (2nd ed, 1924) 284. 
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to default such that a higher interest rate is usually applied to the loan. After the 
dotcom bust and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, interest rates in the 
United States were lowered in an attempt to stimulate the economy.8 This 
promoted investment in housing. Much of that investment took place through 
subprime mortgages that went from comprising less than 15 per cent of US 
mortgages in 2001 to around 50 per cent by 2006.9  
By comparison, during the same period, Australian non-conforming home 
mortgages for people with a poor credit history did not exceed one per cent of 
either total outstanding mortgages or new home mortgages.10 While Australia has 
no exact equivalent to the US market for subprime mortgages, ‘low doc’ and 
loans for up to 100 per cent of the purchase price were issued in Australia.11  
A number of incentives beyond low interest rates promoted US subprime 
lending and borrowing. These include a then widespread belief that property 
prices would continue to rise so that bad loans were not a concern as the house 
could, it was thought, be resold for a profit.  This led to lax lending standards, as 
both borrowers and lenders sought to benefit from the increase in housing prices. 
Further, lenders operated on an ‘originate to distribute’ business model where 
mortgages were onsold shortly after being written, so that the risk of the 
mortgage was passed to another financial institution. In this way, lenders’ focus 
switched from maintaining high credit standards to generating maximum 
volume.12 The housing boom was a classic asset price ‘bubble’.13 The ability to 
easily transfer mortgage debts from the originator’s balance sheet by packaging 
                                                 
8  The US Federal Reserve lowered interest rates from 6.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent in late 2000 and to one 
per cent in 2003: Charles Morris, The Trillion Dollar Meltdown (2008) 59. 
9  See generally Martin Neil Baily, Robert E Litan and Matthew S Johnson, The Origins of the Financial 
Crisis (November 2008) 14–5; Eamonn Butler, ‘The Financial Crisis: Blame Governments Not Bankers’ 
in Philip Booth (ed), Verdict on the Crash: Causes and Policy Implications (2009) 51; Morris, above n 8, 
62–7. 
10  Guy Debelle, ‘A Comparison of the US and Australian Housing Markets’ (Speech delivered at the Sub-
prime Mortgage Meltdown Symposium, Adelaide, 16 May 2008). 
11  Luci Ellis, ‘The Global Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Countermeasures’ (Speech delivered 
at Australia in the Global Storm: A Conference on the Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for 
Australia and its Region, Victoria University, Melbourne, 15 April 2009); RBA, Financial Stability 
Review (September 2005) 39–40. 
12  John Cassidy, ‘Subprime Suspect’ (2008) 84(7) The New Yorker 78, 85; Baily et al, above n 9, 20–1. 
Other incentives included: loans in some US states were non-recourse so that borrowers’ other assets 
could not be accessed in the event of default; the use of adjustable rate mortgages that had low initial 
payments and then reset to a higher rate after two to three years; and interest only or negative 
amortisation (less than full interest is paid) loans that have low repayments at the beginning of the loan 
but increase over time: see generally Allen J Fishbein and Patrick Woodall, ‘Exotic or Toxic? An 
Examination of the Non-Traditional Mortgage Market for Consumers and Lenders’ (May 2006) 
Consumer Federation of America 
<http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Exotic_Toxic_Mortgage_Report0506.pdf> at 25 September 2009.  
13  See generally Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch, ‘A Theory of Fads, Fashion, 
Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades’ (1992) 100(5) Journal of Political Economy 
992; Hyman P Minsky, ‘The Financial Instability Hypothesis’ (Working Paper No 74, Jerome Levy 
Economic Institute, Bard College, 1992); Robert J Shiller, The Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global 
Financial Crisis Happened, and What to Do About It (2008). 
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loans into securities allowed the risk of mortgage defaults to spread well beyond 
traditional mortgage lenders.  
The risk of the subprime mortgage found its way into the global financial 
system through the process of financial innovation that gave rise to 
‘securitisation’ and ‘credit derivatives’.14 Securitisation is the pooling and 
repackaging of cash-flow-producing, but generally illiquid, financial assets into 
securities that are then sold to investors.15 Mortgages, including subprime 
mortgages, were ‘securitised’ in this way, and known as mortgage-backed 
securities (‘MBS’).16 The securitisation process involves pooling the mortgages 
and then separating them into tranches that have different levels of risk, return, 
order of payment and degree of credit support.17 The senior tranche, which is 
rated AAA by a credit rating agency (‘CRA’) such as Moody’s or Standard and 
Poor’s, has the first claim on returns, thus reducing risk but also returning a lower 
yield.18 The bottom tranche is the first to absorb any losses in the MBS but 
enjoys the highest rate of return. The importance of the AAA rating lies in the 
fact that many institutional investors, including municipal authorities, hospitals 
and universities, are required to hold only highly rated securities. The alchemy of 
securitisation allows risky mortgage assets to be turned into highly rated 
investment grade assets available to a wide range of investors.  
Although MBS are often purchased by institutional investors, securitisation 
allowed these assets to be further carved up into yet more specialised and 
complex securities: the ‘collateralised’ debt obligation (‘CDO’). CDOs are made 
up of a pool of various tranches of MBS and other asset backed securities and are 
then separated into further tranches that are sold to investors. The CDO is thus 
another step removed from the actual mortgage as it is composed of the securities 
that were issued as part of the MBS process.19 Ideally, this diversification of risk 
makes investors in the CDO less vulnerable to the problems of a single borrower 
or security. However, the tranching described above allowed the most senior 
tranche in the CDO to have a AAA credit rating even when the ratings of the 
                                                 
14  Morris, above n 8, 73–9. 
15  Paul Ali, The Law of Secured Finance: An International Survey of Security Interests Over Property 
(2002) 7. 
16  The MBS is a subset of asset-backed securities (‘ABS’). MBS may be further classified into residential 
mortgage backed securities (‘RMBS’) and commercial mortgage backed securities (‘CMBS’). The 
process was originally developed in 1983 by US Government-sponsored agencies Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae to alleviate constraints on lenders’ balance sheets so that they could disperse risk, which 
would reduce the costs of borrowing and make more home loans: ibid. 
17  Adam B Ashcraft and Til Schuermann, ‘Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit’, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No 318 (March 2008) 29–36. 
18  The safety of the senior tranche depends on the risk of the underlying asset, but this is reduced through 
the degree of subordination and the level of credit enhancement. Subordination refers to how much of the 
MBS ranks lower than those holding the senior tranche and is thus able to absorb any losses. Credit 
enhancement includes: ‘over-collateralisation’, in which the face value of the mortgage assets is greater 
than the face value of the repackaged securities; and excess spread, whereby the total incoming interest 
received from the mortgage payments exceeds the payments made to securities holders, fees to the issuer 
and any other expenses: Baily et al, above n 9, 24–5. 
19  Baily et al, above n 9, 27. 
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underlying assets were less than AAA – a process described by one analyst as 
‘turning garbage into gold’.20 
To further bolster a CDO’s tranches’ ratings the issuer would purchase a 
Credit Default Swap (‘CDS’) or insurance from monoline insurers, banks, hedge 
funds or even traditional insurers such as AIG.21 The CDS and credit insurance 
allow the insurer to assume, in exchange for payment, the risk of default. If there 
is a default then the party assuming the risk is required to make an agreed 
payment to the other party, thus offsetting their exposure to that risk.22 The 
growth of the market for trading in CDS instruments has led to the total value of 
CDS far exceeding the total value of global corporate debt.23 This creates the 
problem of spreading the losses caused by defaults on loans such as those that 
occurred following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ‘conservatorship’ of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the United States.  
The effectiveness of the tranching in MBS and CDOs and structuring of the 
CDS and insurance depends on a proper understanding of the risk of the 
underlying assets, as the tranching rearranges but does not eliminate that risk.24 
Instead of risk being determined by due diligence on the underlying asset it was 
calculated through highly complicated mathematical formulae called quantitative 
analysis that contributed to greater complexity in financial products and provided 
unwarranted security.25 
As commercial banks were subject to capital requirements in relation to their 
balance sheets,26 but wanted to take on more debt to be able to make the 
investment returns that MBS and CDOs offered, these investments were made 
through Structured Investment Vehicles (‘SIV’) or off-balance-sheet special-
purpose vehicles. When SIV got into financial difficulties the banks would bring 
them onto their balance sheet to preserve the bank’s reputation.27 Investment 
Banks and SIVs funded their investment in MBS and CDOs through short-term 
                                                 
20  Michael Lewis, ‘The End’ Condé Nast Portfolio (New York), December 2008, 122. 
21  ‘Caveat Counterparty’, The Economist (London), 22 March 2008, 100. 
22  Satyajit Das, Credit Derivatives and Credit Linked Notes (2nd ed, 2000) 27 – 8. 
23  The Bank for International Settlements (‘BIS’) estimates that the total notional value for credit default 
swaps worldwide in December 2008 was in excess of US$41 trillion. This may be compared with the 
estimated total value of international debt securities during the same period at US$4.5 trillion: Joint BIS-
IMF-OECD-World Bank, Joint External Debt Hub: Creditor/Markets Tables (2009) JEDH 
<http://www.jedh.org/jedh_metadata-line per cent20items.html> at 2 August 2009; BIS, ‘Table 19: 
Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives by Risk Category and Instrument’ 
<http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf> at 11 June 2009. 
24  Baily et al, above n 9, 24–5. 
25  Satyajit Das, Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives 
(2006) 182–210; ‘In Plato's Cave’, The Economist (London), 24 January 2009, 12. 
26  APRA, Australian Prudential Standard 112: Capital Adequacy: A Standardised Approach to Credit Risk 
(January 2008); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital 
Measurements and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (‘Basel II Accord’) (June 2004). 
27  Baily et al, above n 9, 29.  
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borrowing by way of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (‘ABCP’) and repurchase 
agreements that had to be rolled over regularly, often within a matter of days.28  
The above financial products – MBS, CDOs and CDS – were attractive to 
both investment banks, who could make large fees through the creation, sale and 
underwriting of the product, and also to investment bankers, who could earn 
large bonuses. The products were equally attractive to investors, who believed 
they were able to earn secure higher returns on products with AAA credit ratings 
compared with government bonds that attracted similar ratings but that, because 
interest rates were at historic lows, offered much lower yields. The credit rating 
became a crucial indicator of risk as investors were not in a position to evaluate 
the quality of the underlying asset.29 Indeed, the investment mandate for many 
institutional investors often prohibited investments in creditor products that had 
not been rated by at least two out of the three large international CRAs 
(Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings). Investors also took 
advantage of low interest rates by using debt to leverage their investments.30 In 
Australia, this coincided with the growth of margin lending and the spectacular 
rise (and fall) of financial firms that promoted the practice, such as Opes Prime 
and Storm Financial.31  
In the United States, interest rates were raised by the Federal Reserve as 
concerns about inflation arose. The housing market also began to cool while, at 
the same time, ‘teaser rates’ expired and interest rates on many mortgages began 
to reset at much higher levels.  
In the beginning of 2007 a number of subprime lenders in the United States 
began filing for bankruptcy including the largest subprime lender, New Century 
Financial.32 In July 2007, the links between the property market and the financial 
system started to become apparent when two Bear Stearns hedge funds 
specialising in subprime debt announced significant losses resulting in them 
filing for bankruptcy.33 A number of private equity deals were unable to access 
financing at an acceptable rate and were terminated.34 In the United Kingdom, 
the Bank of England was forced to extend emergency funding to Northern Rock, 
                                                 
28  Ibid 30–1. Goldman Sachs supported US$1.1 trillion of assets with US$40 billion of equity and Merrill 
Lynch supported US$1 trillion of assets with US$30 billion of equity: ‘What Went Wrong’, The 
Economist (London) 22 March 2008, 92. 
29  Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons From the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown’ 
(2008) 93(2) Minnesota Law Review 373, 404. 
30  Baily et al, above n 9, 27. 
31  See, eg, Storm Financial Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2008] FCA 1991; Beconwood 
Securities Pty Ltd & Anor v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd & Ors (2008) 246 ALR 361. 
32  Julie Creswell, ‘Mortgage Lender New Century Financial Files for Bankruptcy’, New York Times (New 
York), 2 April 2007 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/business/worldbusiness/02iht-
loans.5.5118838.html> at 25 May 2009. 
33  Morris, above n 8. 80. 
34  Ibid 81. 
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a large British mortgage lender. Northern Rock was subsequently nationalised in 
early 2008.35 
From July to August 2007 in Australia, Basis Capital’s investment vehicle 
Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), which invested A$1 billion in asset-backed 
and credit securities exposed to subprime mortgages, suspended redemptions and 
was then placed into liquidation after defaulting on margin calls from its 
financiers.36 Similarly, Absolute Capital suspended two funds worth around 
A$200 million due to a lack of liquidity in global structured credit markets and 
later appointed a voluntary administrator.37 
The impact of subprime on the debt markets is illustrated by RAMS Home 
Loans Group which listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (‘ASX’) on 27 July 
2007 at A$2.50 a share. Despite having no exposure to subprime mortgages, the 
material increases in spreads and shortages of liquidity in the US debt capital 
markets, where RAMS obtained a large portion of its funding, resulted in a 
substantial decline in earnings and a share price of around 25 cents. The sale of 
its brand name and network of 97 franchise outlets ensued.38 
In late 2007, Merrill Lynch and Citigroup wrote down US$7.9 billion and 
US$11 billion respectively in bad debts from losses related to subprime 
mortgages, resulting in the resignation of their CEOs. Citigroup obtained a 
capital injection from the Abu Dhabi government. In December 2007, Morgan 
Stanley announced US$9.4 billion in write downs from subprime losses and 
received a capital injection from a Chinese sovereign wealth fund of 
US$5 billion. Centro Properties Group, the second largest shopping centre owner 
in Australia and the fifth largest in the United States, announced that it was 
having difficulty rolling over A$3.9 billion in debt that was followed by its share 
price declining by 90 per cent in the 12 months to mid-January 2008.39  
The decline in Centro’s share price was emblematic of a significant reduction 
in the performance of many highly leveraged Australian managed investment 
                                                 
35  Tripartite Statement by HM Treasury, Bank of England and Financial Services Authority, ‘News Release 
Liquidity Support Facility for Northern Rock plc’ (Press Release, 14 September 2007); Alistair Darling, 
‘Statement on the Nationalisation of the Northern Rock Bank’, BBC News (London), 17 February 2008 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7249575.stm> at 25 May 2009. 
36  Basis Capital Funds Management Ltd v BT Portfolio Services Ltd & Ors (2008) 219 FLR 157; Stuart 
Washington, ‘Subprime Turmoil Claims Australia’s Basis Fund’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 
30 August 2007 <http://www.smh.com.au/news/business/subprime-turmoil-claims-australias-basis-
fund/2007/08/30/1188067234101.html> at 25 May 2009. 
37  Absolute Capital, ‘Absolute Capital Temporarily Closes its Yield Strategies Funds to Protect Investors’ 
(Press Release, 25 July 2007); Peter Ryan, ‘US Subprime Mortgage Crisis Hits Aust Funds’ ABC News 
(Sydney) 26 July 2007; McGrathNicol, ‘Absolute Capital Group Limited Board Appoints Voluntary 
Administrator’ (Press Release, 27 November 2007). 
38  Bryan Frith, ‘New RAMS Shareholders Left Bleating’, The Australian (Sydney), 15 August 2007 
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22246684-16941,00.html> at 25 May 2009; 
Danny John, ‘$5.2B Deal Saves RHG Group’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 9 February 2008 
<http://business.smh.com.au/business/52b-deal-saves-rhg-group-20080208-1r3o.html> at 25 May 2009. 
39  Centro Properties Group, ‘Centro Earnings Revision and Refinancing Update’ (Press Release, 17 
December 2007); Centro Retail Trust, ‘Centro Retail Trust Announces Interim Extension of A$1.2 
Billion in Maturing Facilities’ (Press Release, 17 December 2007); Mathew Dunckley and Ben Wilmot, 
‘Centro Acts to Appease Banks’, The Australian Financial Review (Melbourne) 16 January 2008, 1. 
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schemes, including listed property trusts, as refinancing of debt became more 
expensive.40 During this time the price of corporate debt rose significantly as the 
supply of credit tightened, making it much more difficult for companies to raise 
new funds or roll over existing loans.41 
In January 2008 Australia’s main share indexes fell more than seven per cent 
– their biggest one-day falls since 1989 – cutting about A$100 billion from the 
value of shares.42 
In March 2008 HSBC, the UK’s largest bank, reported a US$17.2 billion loss 
on write downs of its US mortgage portfolio. At the same time, France’s largest 
retail bank, Credit Agricole, announced an €857 million loss after write-downs of 
€3.3 billion on its exposure to the credit crisis.43 Further write-downs and losses 
followed. 
March 2008 also saw rumours begin to appear that Bear Stearns may have 
liquidity problems and by 16 March 2008, JP Morgan Chase announced that it 
would acquire Bear Stearns for US$2 per share, later raised to US$10 per share. 
Bear Stearns had traded at US$30 per share only two days earlier. The steep 
discount was an attempt to balance the need to maintain confidence in financial 
markets but without creating the risk of moral hazard – if people were protected 
from their own irresponsibility they will be more likely to be irresponsible in the 
future.44  
In mid-2008 the terms ‘subprime’ and ‘credit crunch’ were recognised as 
new words in the English language by the Oxford English Dictionary and the 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary.45 
That September the US government was forced to take control of Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae, government-sponsored entities that were created to 
                                                 
40  See, eg, Peter Studley, ‘Risk, Re-adjustment and Recovery’ (2008) 1(8) Australian and New Zealand 
Property Journal 641, 643–4 (reporting on an unprecedented market sell-off of listed property trusts, 
listed property returns being negative 42 per cent and cutting of distributions). 
41  The cost of issuing BBB rated corporate bonds (which is the lowest rating for investment grade 
securities) as calculated by the spread between the yields offered by these bonds over government bond 
yields (which offer a virtually risk free rate of return) almost doubled between 2007 and 2008, rising from 
250 basis point (2.5 per cent) in April 2007 to 449 basis points in December 2008. This spread has since 
increased further to be as high as 582 basis points on 21 April 2009: RBA, ‘Capital Market Yields and 
Spreads-Non-Government Instruments’ (2009) RBA <http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/bulletin/F03.pdf> 
at 26 May 2009.  
42  Ruth Williams and Vanessa Burrow, ‘Black Tuesday Wipes off $100 Billion’, The Age (Melbourne), 23 
January 2008 <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2008/01/22/1200764265886.html> at 25 May 2009. 
43  ‘HSBC in $17bn Credit Crisis Loss’, BBC News (London), 3 March 2008 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7274385.stm> at 25 May 2009; ‘Credit Agricole's $10b Call to 
Shareholders’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 14 May 2008, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/business/credit-agricoles-10b-call-to-shareholders-20080514-2dzj.html> at 14 
September, 2009. 
44  James Surowiecki, ‘Too Dumb to Fail’ The New Yorker (New York), 31 March 2008, 46. 
45  Peter Hutchison, ‘Credit Crunch and Subprime Join the Oxford English Dictionary’, Telegraph (London), 
4 July 2008 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/3053926/Credit-crunch-and-sub-prime-join-
the-Oxford-English-Dictionary.html> at 25 May 2009; Stephanie Reitz, ‘Merriam-Webster Unveils New 
Dictionary Words’, San Francisco Chronicle (San Francisco), 7 July 2008 <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2008/07/07/national/a114607D83.DTL&hw=webster&sn=001&sc=1000> at 25 
May 2009. 
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generate funding for the US housing market through securitising home loans, and 
the US$5 trillion in home loans they back, in what may become the world’s 
largest financial bailout.46  
Concerns were voiced about the fate of American investment banks in mid-
2008. On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers announced it would file for 
bankruptcy and the Bank of America announced that it would acquire Merrill 
Lynch for US$50 billion.47 On 16 September 2008, the US Federal Reserve 
announced it would lend AIG, once the world’s largest insurance company with a 
market value of US$239 billion, US$85 billion in emergency funds due to its 
insurance of various financial products resulting in substantial losses and impacts 
on its balance sheet.48 On 17 September 2008, Lloyds announced it would take 
over HBOS, previously the UK’s largest savings institution, for ₤12 billion.49 On 
22 September 2008, the remaining American investment banks, Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley were approved by the Federal Reserve to become bank 
holding companies that subjects them to regulation by the Federal Reserve.50 The 
failure of Washington Mutual, the sixth largest US bank, on 25 September 2008 
marks the largest bank failure in US history.51 In the UK, the government 
nationalised Bradford & Bingley.52 
On 12 October 2008, the Australian federal government announced that it 
would guarantee all deposits held by authorised deposit taking institutions 
regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (‘APRA’) including 
Australian banks, building societies and Australian subsidiaries of foreign banks. 
This measure also included a guarantee over debt securities offered by these 
institutions.53 This was to allow financial institutions to raise capital more easily 
at a time when the liquidity of credit markets was very tight.  
The fourth quarter of 2008 saw inter-bank markets, in which banks loan 
money to each other, almost halt as trust in contractual counterparties no longer 
                                                 
46  David Ellis, ‘US Seizes Fannie and Freddie’, CNN Money (New York), 7 September 2008 
<http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/companies/fannie_freddie/index.htm> at 25 May 2009. 
47  Carrick Mollenkamp et al, ‘Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG Seeks Cash’, Wall Street 
Journal (New York), 16 September 2008, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122145492097035549.html> 
at 14 September 2009. 
48  ‘AIG’s Rescue – Size Matters’, The Economist (London), 20 September 2008, 85. 
49  ‘Lloyds TSB Seals £12bn HBOS Deal’, BBC News (London), 17 September 2008 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7622180.stm> at 26 May 2009. See also ‘Lloyds HBOS Merger 
Gets Go-ahead’, BBC News (London), 12 January 2009, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7823521.stm> at 14 September 2009. 
50  ‘Federal Reserve Approves Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley Bank Applications’, Forbes: Thompson 
Financial News, 22 September 2008, <http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2008/09/22/afx5454896.html> at 
14 September 2009; see also Lewis, above n 20, 157. 
51  Elinor Comlay and Jonathan Stempel, ‘WaMu Is Largest US Bank Failure’, Reuters (London), 26 
September 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE48P01R20080926> at 14 September 
2009. 
52  ‘B&B Nationalisation Is Confirmed’, BBC News (London), 29 September 2008 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7641193.stm> at 26 May 2009. 
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existed.54 Short-term borrowings could not be rolled over at all or at the 
previously low interest rates, and concerns grew that insurance and CDS could 
become ineffective if the counter-party was insolvent.55 
In November 2008 the US government agreed to rescue Citigroup, resulting 
in the government receiving warrants to buy shares. In early 2009, the US 
Treasury announced it would take a 36 per cent equity stake in Citigroup.56  
In Australia the effect of leverage was graphically illustrated when two of the 
boom sharemarket darlings, ABC Learning and Allco, were placed into 
receivership and administration after months of share price declines and attempts 
to renegotiate debt.57 Other companies have had to undertake large equity capital 
raisings to help repay high debt levels, particularly in the property and minerals 
sectors.58  
By the end of 2008, litigation trends in the United States revealed a large 
increase in the filing of subprime cases, including securities class actions.59 On a 
smaller scale in Australia, class actions were commenced or threatened against 
Centro, ABC Learning, Allco and National Australia Bank for alleged defective 
disclosure related to debt and leverage problems.60 
                                                 
54  Claudio M Loser, Global Financial Turmoil and Emerging Market Economies: Major Contagion and a 
Shocking Loss of Wealth (2009) 7. The ‘TED spread’ – the difference between the three-month dollar 
LIBOR (London inter-bank offered rate) and the Treasury Bill rate – is a measure of the risk aversion 
shown by banks and went from 20 basis point or one-fifth of a percentage in early 2007 to 3.3 per cent in 
October 2008: ‘Blocked Pipes’, The Economist (London), 4 October 2008, 70–2. 
55  ‘Wall Street’s Bad Dream’, The Economist (London), 20 September 2008, 81–2. 
56  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, ‘Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve and the FDIC on 
Citigroup’ (Press Release, 23 November 2008); David Enrich and Deborah Soloman, ‘Citi, US Reach 
Accord on a Third Bailout’, Wall Street Journal (New York), 28 February 2009 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123573611480193881.html> at 26 May 2009. 
57  McGrathNicol, ‘ABC Childcare Centres to Remain Open’ (Press Release, 6 November 2008); 
McGrathNicol, ‘Allco Finance Group Limited: Creditor Information’ (2008–09) McGrathNicol 
<http://www.mcgrathnicol.com/currentprojects/allco/Pages/creditorinformation.aspx> at 2 August 2009. 
58  In the financial year to June 2009 a record A$90 billion of new capital was raised on the ASX comprising 
A$1.9billion in initial public offerings (down 83 per cent on the previous year) and secondary raisings of 
A$88.1 billion (up 74 per cent on the previous year). See ‘ASX Group Monthly Activity Report – June 
2009’ (Market Announcement, 6 July 2009). 
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<http://www.oakbridgeins.com/clients/blog/subprimelawsuitslist.doc> at 2 August 2009. 
60  James Eyers and Alex Boxsell, ‘Shareholders Queue to Sue’, The Australian Financial Review 
(Melbourne), 30 January 2009, 56; Alex Boxsell, ‘Mum and Dad Take to Class Action’, The Australian 
Financial Review (Melbourne), 11 July 2009, 37–9; there has also been litigation against Lehman 
Brothers Australia in respect of alleged misleading conduct by one of its subsidiaries in relation to the 
marketing of complex CDO products to conservative institutional investors such as local government 
authorities, charities and universities: Lehman Brothers Australia Limited v Wingecarribee Shire Council 
[2009] FCAFC 63; PPB, Section 439A Report to Creditors of Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (19 March 
2009); Susannah Moran, ‘Nothing for Creditors in Lehman Proposal’, The Australian (Sydney), 27 May 
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Late 2008 and 2009 saw a concerted global response to the GFC with 
meetings of the G8 and G20 aimed at regulatory reform and national 
governments adopting a variety of mechanisms for economic stimulus.61 The 
recently elected Obama administration, the government at the epicentre of the 
GFC, set out its response to the GFC in the US Department of the Treasury, 
Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial 
Supervision and Regulation (June 2009).62 
 
III UNDERLYING THEMES 
This part will identify the underlying themes explaining the nature and scope 
of the financial crisis. The discussion will focus first on those factors that 
contributed to the germination of the crisis and then will expand to include those 
factors that operated to exacerbate and prolong its adverse effects. 
 
A Transparency 
Former US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously said ‘sunlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.’63 
This comment encapsulates the raison d’être of modern securities regulation. 
Securities laws around the world have followed the lead of the New Deal statutes 
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 USC §§ 77a–77aa (1933) and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC §§ 78a–78lll (1934) in focusing regulation on the 
disclosure of information deemed important to potential investors. The rise of the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (‘ECMH’)64 in the late 1960s and its 
increasing popularity in the succeeding decades has placed transparency of 
securities in a central position within the regulatory framework.65 The EMCH 
argues that efficient capital markets are able to rapidly incorporate information 
into the prices offered for securities traded over those markets. The central idea is 
that investors should be able to rely on securities prices as they reflect the 
collective market’s valuation sentiment based on information that is publicly 
                                                 
61  See, eg, ‘G20, Global Plan for Recovery and Reform: The Communiqué from the London Summit’ (2 
April 2009) G20 <www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf> at 26 May 2009; Douglas W Arner, 
‘The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes and Consequences’ (2009) 43 International Lawyer 91, 119–
34; Wayne Swan, ‘Extraordinary Times Demand Extraordinary Action’ (Speech delivered at the London 
School of Economics, London, 13 March 2009).  
62  Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial 
Supervision and Regulation (June 2009). 
63  Louis D Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It (1914) 92. 
64  Eugene Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25(2) 
Journal of Finance 383;  Razeen Sappideen, ‘Securities Market Efficiency Reconsidered’ (1988) 9 
University of Tasmania Law Review 132; Entcho Raykovski, ‘Continuous Disclosure: Has Regulation 
Enhanced the Australian Securities Market?’ (2004) 30 Monash University Law Review 269. 
65  There are, however, numerous criticisms of the underlying theory, particularly from the field of 
behavioural finance: see, Raykovski, above n 64; Angie Zandstra, Jason Harris and Anil Hargovan, 
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available. In Australia this has included regulatory measures covering both 
periodic and continuous disclosure obligations that aim to ensure material 
information is disclosed to the market in a timely manner.66 
Perhaps the key theme underpinning the genesis of the GFC has been the lack 
of effective transparency concerning the underling products noted above, 
including MBS, CDOs, CDS and a range of other ‘alphabet soup’ derivative 
products.67 The levels of disclosure concerning the risks of these products were 
not always sufficient to allow end users to understand the risks involved, even in 
circumstances where the disclosures that were made satisfied existing legal 
obligations.68 The role of credit ratings over these products is also important here 
and will be discussed further below. 
Why were these products not transparent? There are several reasons that 
contributed to the lack of understanding about these products – dubbed ‘financial 
weapons of mass destruction’ by investment manager Warren Buffett.69 First, the 
complexity of the arrangements made understanding these products difficult even 
for sophisticated investors.70 That complexity was driven by a range of factors 
including the lack of a central trading platform, such as that which exists for 
traditional securities like shares and options. This meant that each CDO or CDS 
was created individually, with idiosyncratic features and disclosures, making 
comparisons between products difficult for investors. Each product originator 
marketed their special expertise in financial engineering and their individual 
capacity to design the next useful instrument for securing high yields and 
favourable tax treatment. Second, products based on derivatives have 
traditionally been exempt from consumer protection disclosure laws on the 
assumption that they are only traded between sophisticated investors. Third, these 
particular products were typically designed with a view to avoid adverse 
regulatory consequences (particularly tax laws) that would turn a simple MBS 
into a complex structure. This would secure favourable regulatory 
characterisation, even if only by obfuscation. As the head of the UK Financial 
Services Authority said in January 2009: 
Not all innovation is equally useful. If by some terrible accident the world lost the 
knowledge required to manufacture one of our major drugs or vaccines, human 
welfare would be seriously harmed. If the instructions for creating a CDO squared 
have now been mislaid, we will I think get along quite well without. And in the 
years running up to 2007, too much of the developed world’s intellectual talent 
was devoted to ever more complex financial innovations, whose maximum 
                                                 
66  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 2M, ss 674, 675. 
67  Adair Turner, ‘The Financial Crisis and the Future of Financial Regulation’ (Speech delivered at The 
Economist’s Inaugural City Lecture, London, 21 January 2009). 
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‘Rethinking the Financial Network’ (Speech delivered at the Financial Student Association, Amsterdam, 
April 2009) 17; see also Table 2, 37; see also APRA, ASIC and RBA, Survey of the OTC Derivatives 
Market in Australia (May 2009). 
69  Warren Buffett, 2002 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders (2002) Berkshire Hathaway 
<http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf > at 2 August 2009, 15. 
70  See generally, Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets 
(2003). 
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possible benefit in terms of allocative efficiency was at best marginal, and which 
in their complexity and opacity created large financial stability risks.71  
The triumph of complexity over substance has also been driven by an 
increasing reliance on complex financial mathematics. Since the early days of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model72 and the Black/Scholes option pricing model73 in 
the 1970s, investment firms have recruited analysts and traders with skills in 
quantitative analysis.74 Over time, quantitative analysis and its complex models 
(such as the many variations of the value at risk models or ‘VAR’) moved from a 
measure used to verify prudential investment standards to becoming a major 
prudential and risk management tool for many investment firms.75 This fed back 
into financial product design with many investment products designed primarily 
on complex financial models that hinged on their predictive capabilities.76 The 
concept of tranching discussed above, central to the marketability of CDOs, 
depends on assuring investors (and CRAs) that the originator’s financial 
modelling can accurately predict potential adverse events such as default rates.  
The use of financial modelling as the main tool for modern risk management 
has contributed significantly to the growing complexity of financial products and 
the consequential lack of transparency about the risks associated with those 
products. However, the utility of a model is determined by the strength of its 
underlying assumptions, the accuracy of the data included in using the model and 
the ability of the model to predict previously unforeseen potentialities (the so 
called ‘black swan event’).77 As the Turner Review noted in its final report on 
international banking regulation: ‘It is clear in retrospect that the VAR measures 
of risk were faulty and that required trading book capital was inadequate’.78  
The size of the market and its high degree of risk concentration, itself 
generating systemic risk, compound these problems of complexity.79 For 
example, the high credit ratings given to many complex structured instruments 
were based partly on the existence of bond insurance conferred by companies 
such as Ambac and MBIA. These institutions (known as ‘monoline insurers’) had 
traditionally been involved in insuring municipal bonds that are relatively 
conservative, low yield financial products. Monoline insurers sought increasing 
profits by providing insurance over structured financial instruments such as 
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77  Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007). 
78  Financial Services Authority (‘FSA’), The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking 
Crisis (March 2009) 19. 
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CDOs, which in turn provided partial justification for AAA credit ratings over 
senior tranches of the CDOs. However, the value of the insurance depends on the 
reliability of the insurer. If a monoline insurer’s corporate credit rating decreased, 
the value of its insurance over CDOs and other products would also decrease, 
causing widespread credit downgrades as structured instruments and investment 
managers could no longer hold the instrument due to investment mandates.  
The large US monoline insurer MBIA provides a stark illustration of the 
potential for systemic risk posed by CDOs. At the end of December 2008 MBIA 
had provided insurance over approximately US$127 billion of CDOs. At the 
same time, MBIA had under US$1 billion in equity.80 If MBIA were unable to 
pay the insurance covered by these amounts, the CDOs would be sold off on a 
massive scale as widespread credit downgrades forced asset sales, thereby 
flooding the market with already unpopular products and crushing the market 
price of the assets. 
 
B Valuation 
One important consequence of the lack of transparency regarding the risks 
associated with financial products has been the increasing difficulty of valuing 
these products, both as assets of the end purchasers, and as liabilities of the 
product issuers. For example, rising default rates in the US subprime market 
created uncertainty about the reliability of the financial modelling used to rate the 
risks associated with CDO products based on these mortgages. There is a well 
known behavioural trait that leads investors to assume the worst in the absence of 
complete information.81 This is because firms have an incentive to release 
positive information (as share prices may rise as a result) and an incentive to 
conceal negative information (as share prices may fall as a result). Thus, 
investors who were unsure of the quality of the valuations of the underlying 
assets likely assumed the worst – ie that the assets were worthless. As buyers for 
these products disappeared, the securitisation market virtually closed. This was a 
significant contributing factor in driving up the cost of corporate finance.82 
Rising corporate finance costs were also caused by increasing demand for 
traditional bank debt when the securitisation and short-term commercial paper 
market closed down.  Another cause was the failure or contraction of lending by 
hedge funds and other institutional investors (the so called ‘shadow banking 
sector’ discussed below). Bank lenders engaged in credit rationing both because 
of uncertainty about the valuations of their own assets and because of concern 
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11 June 2009. 
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regarding the asset valuations maintained by borrowers, even in the inter-bank 
lending market.  
These problems have also highlighted tensions with current international 
accounting standards, particularly the ‘fair value’ system that requires companies 
to regularly mark the value of their assets to market price.83 In the extraordinary 
times of the financial crisis this has meant marking values to a virtually 
nonexistent market. When market value is the price that a fair-minded buyer is 
prepared to pay from a not-impatient seller how does one value assets that cannot 
be sold at any price because the market for that class of assets (such as CDOs) 
has closed down? The answer for many companies was $0. This seems 
unreasonable given that even a pool of high risk subprime mortgages is likely to 
have some borrowers who repay their loans on time, which means the underlying 
assets in many cases have value, albeit a value that will take 20–40 years to be 
realised.84 The problems associated with fair value accounting for illiquid 
markets have been recently recognised by the Basel Committee, which has issued 
guidelines to banks that allow greater judgment in marking asset values to 
illiquid market valuations, particularly where one or more transactions (ie asset 
sales) have occurred at less than expected value due to illiquid market 
conditions.85 
 
C Incentive Misalignment 
Much of corporate law regulation is concerned with the problem of agency 
costs, which arise whenever there is a separation between ownership and 
control.86 The common response to the problem of agency costs is to seek to 
align the interests of management with the perceived interests of investors87 
through the use of executive share schemes and other bonding devices. Similarly, 
it is common for major corporations to offer employees bonuses pegged to 
performance hurdles linked with corporate success. In investment banking, 
individual bonuses could reach astonishing levels – in the tens of millions of 
dollars each year for ‘rainmaker’ employees who brought in deals worth billions 
of dollars.  
As noted above, over-the-counter derivatives are idiosyncratic products, 
creating the potential for high profit margins because of the lack of competition 
or comparison. On the other hand, competing firms could easily replicate highly 
successful products, which meant first that there was a constant imperative to 
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84  See generally David Roderic Myddelton, ‘Accounting Aspects of the Financial Crisis’ in Booth, above n 
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innovate, and second that the profits from particular products would not remain 
high in the long or even medium term. This created a high-pressure environment 
to make fast profits by designing and selling new complex products to corporate 
and institutional investors. The incentives created by this environment were, in 
hindsight, overly weighted towards rewarding short-term behaviour that favoured 
large deals over sustainable future profits. This has been recognised by several 
major institutions changing their remuneration practices to reward longer term 
benefits.88 
It should also be noted that salaries in investment banking are not driven 
solely by the hubris or greed of investment bankers but were substantially 
influenced by the competition for high quality employees across the finance 
industry, including lucrative packages offered by the funds management and 
hedge fund industry in recent years.89 Another way of looking at individual 
incentives is through the lens of conflicts of interest, which are discussed below 
in Part IV. 
The problem of incentive misalignment contributes to the ‘procyclicality’ of 
the banking system. It is generally accepted that banks tend to operate in tandem 
with macroeconomic cycles by engaging in higher risk activities during boom 
times and thereby suffering substantial losses during recessions. Incentive 
misalignment through huge short-term bonus payments encouraged traders to 
‘bet the house’ during boom times. The near collapse of the US insurance giant 
AIG is ample evidence of the problems that can be caused for financial stability 
when ‘casino capitalism’90 takes hold. 
Some have argued that the Basel II banking capital requirements further 
entrench the ‘procyclicality’ of the banking system.91 The Basel II Accord is 
based on risk-weighted assets, with the risk weighting given to certain assets 
based on ratings given by CRAs. The lower the credit rating the greater the risk 
weighting given to the asset.92 Unfortunately, the Basel II requirements, which 
have been widely adopted, resulted in financial institutions across the globe 
seeking out similar asset classes and similar highly rated securities that would 
carry lower risk weighting. Therefore, falls in the market value of these highly 
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bonuses spread over three years depending on a range of conditions, including no government bailouts 
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rated securities has been felt throughout the financial sector. Capital adequacy 
rules that were designed to improve the stability of individual banks, have instead 
increased the level of systemic instability. There is also the problem of Basel II 
focusing on capital adequacy rather than adequate levels of liquidity.93 The 
problems of similar assets being held by most financial institutions can generate 
significant market-wide problems when ratings downgrades occur and large 
volumes of similar assets need to be sold. This can render previously highly rated 
assets almost illiquid because market values may substantially decline as volume 
forced sales occur.94  
Apart from the inadequacies of the Basel II Accord, it is clear that the short-
term mentality of some finance executives and traders worked in tandem with the 
‘procyclical’ nature of the banking system to create a bigger problem than the 
root cause of subprime mortgage defaults. However, short-termism could not 
have caused the damage it did without the ready supply of capital provided by the 
largely unregulated shadow banking system. 
 
D New Pools of Capital 
Another major factor in the depth of the financial crisis has been the 
increasingly important roles in credit provision played by non-traditional lenders 
such as hedge funds and money-market funds as well as credit provided by the 
securitisation process. It is estimated that this ‘shadow banking system’ 
comprised in excess of 80 per cent of the total credit provided in the US economy 
prior to the financial crisis.95 Much of this lending capacity was provided by 
leverage and securitisation (discussed above), which depended on the low official 
interest rates. Low interest rates were driven by a range of factors, including the 
increasing role played by sovereign bodies with large trade surpluses generated 
by rising commodities prices and an export boom. These surplus funds were 
often used to purchase safe US treasury bonds, which put downward pressure on 
bond yields.96 
Low bond yields caused investors to seek out the higher yields offered by so-
called ‘alternative investment classes’, such as hedge funds and private equity 
funds. The money provided to these funds came from diverse sources including 
wealthy investors, pension funds, other alternative investment bodies (so-called 
‘fund of funds’) and of course through the purchase and sale of CDOs.  
Once the short term money markets and securitisation markets tightened up 
in 2007–8, the shadow banking system shrank dramatically. This had several 
                                                 
93  FSA, above n 78; Arner, above n 61. 
94  FSA, above n 78. 
95  ‘Too Big to Swallow’, The Economist (London), 16 May 2009 
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important consequences. In particular, the declining profitability of these funds 
(particularly hedge funds) caused in some cases a dramatic rise in redemption 
requests from investors. Numerous funds have closed down, many more have 
limited or even frozen redemptions by investors.  
The growing number of redemption requests has caused some funds to 
liquidate large portions of their asset portfolios, in many cases through forced 
sales at well below book value for the assets. This has had flow-on effects on the 
broader economy by contributing to a general decline in asset prices, particularly 
with respect to securities and real property. This can create a negative feedback 
loop where declining asset prices lower the profitability of funds and sap investor 
confidence, resulting in further redemptions and asset sales.  
One thing is clear: low interest rates and (comparatively) easy access to credit 
set the foundation for the initial asset price bubble to develop and expand. 
Failures by central banks to reign in ‘irrational exuberance’97 by tightening 
monetary policy, and by federal governments to maintain conservative fiscal 
policy, allowed the asset bubble to become unsustainable.  
 
E Regulatory Gaps 
Financial regulation takes both direct and indirect forms. Direct financial 
regulation occurs through the role and powers of government regulators, such as 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’). Regulators may 
be responsible for specific issues – for example APRA which regulates 
prudential capital requirements – or have a broader brief, for example ASIC, 
which includes primary supervision of financial services licensing, consumer 
protection as well as corporate governance and corporate disclosure. Indirect 
regulation can occur through the use of particular non-government bodies who 
act as gatekeepers, such as auditors, lawyers and credit ratings agencies. The role 
of gatekeepers is discussed below in Part IV.  
Many of the problems associated with the financial crisis have involved 
banks and bank lending practices.98 Banks were able to lend to borrowers who 
could not repay the loans, to sell the risky loans through complex financial 
products and to invest in opaque securities because of the lack of effective and 
clear regulatory oversight.  This was particularly so in the United States, although 
banking regulators in other countries such as England, Germany and Switzerland 
have also been heavily criticised,99 and particularly with regard to investment 
                                                 
97  Alan Greenspan, ‘The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society’ (Speech delivered at the 
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<www.newstatesman.com/business/2007/09/northern-rock-bank-crisis> at 26 May 2009; FSA, above n 
78. 
99  FSA, above n 78; Department of Treasury, above n 62; Booth, above n 9. 
368 UNSW Law Journal Volume 32(2) 
banking and derivatives.100 With the exception of AIG, General Motors and 
Chrysler in the United States, the majority of large-scale bailouts and 
bankruptcies caused by the crisis have involved banks.101  
It is clear that bank supervision has contributed to the size, severity and 
duration of the credit crisis.102 Aside from the role of the Basel II Accord, 
discussed above, two issues stand out in particular. First, the failure of banking 
regulators, particularly in the United States, to limit or seemingly to curtail in any 
way the extraordinary risks taken by banks (both investment and commercial) or 
to minimise the large concentration of risk being held in a small number of 
institutions. For example, after taking over Bear Stearns in 2008, it was estimated 
that JP Morgan Chase held over 25 per cent of all of the world’s CDS. Given the 
destruction of value generated by CDS trading at AIG, it seems extraordinary 
that so much risk, both before and after the takeover, could be concentrated in 
one institution without banking regulators taking action.  
Furthermore, the patchwork of regulation in the US banking system seems to 
have facilitated the banks’ high risks. Unlike Australia, the US has a fragmented 
system of banking regulation, involving both state and federal banking 
regulators.103 Australian banks and other authorised deposit taking institutions 
are regulated by APRA within the framework of the Banking Act 1959 (Cth). The 
Reserve Bank of Australia provides regulatory supervision of the overall 
payment system and regulates the cost of credit through its responsibilities for 
setting monetary policy. US banks, on the other hand, have a range of state 
regulatory bodies (such as the New York State Banking Board) as well as 
national bodies under the overarching jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve System 
that has 12 separate banks and 24 individual branches, under the overall 
chairmanship of Ben Bernanke and the other board of governors.104  
The Federal Reserve has responsibility for the overall supply and pricing of 
money for federal banks, and also sets capital adequacy requirements. Of course, 
not all banks are federal, which means that state banking regulators also have this 
responsibility. Other federal bodies, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift 
                                                 
100  See Lawrence A Cunningham and David T Zaring, ‘The Three or Four Approaches to Financial 
Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response’ (2009) forthcoming George 
Washington Law Review.  
101  For a list of institutions receiving financial assistance from the US Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(‘TARP’) see <http://www.financialstability.gov/impact/contracts_list.htm> at 20 June 2009; The New 
York Times also maintains an up to date list of relief recipients according to industry type with almost all 
of the recipients in the banking industry: Matthew Ericson, Elaine He and Amy Schoenfeld ‘Tracking the 
$700 Billion Bail Out’ (2009) New York Times, <http://projects.nytimes.com/creditcrisis/recipients/table> 
at 2 August 2009.  
102  See generally FSA, above n 78; Booth, above n 9. 
103  Mark Jickling and Edward V Murphy, R40249 Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of US Financial 
Supervision (24 February 2009); Heidi Mandanis Schooner and Michael Taylor, ‘Convergence and 
Competition: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States’ (1999) 20(4) Michigan 
Journal of International Law 595; Andreas Busch, Banking Regulation and Globalization (2009) ch 3. 
104  See generally Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, <www.federalreserve.gov> at 3 August 
2009. 
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Supervision, also have a role in setting capital adequacy requirements for banks 
and other deposit taking and lending institutions. The complex web of federal 
and state regulators, each with their own requirements and supervisory powers, 
generates considerable regulatory gaps that appear to have been exploited with 
banks in the US taking huge risks on structured finance instruments. These 
problems were exacerbated by the systemic risk posed by the increasingly 
important shadow banking sector.105 The banking regulatory gaps that existed in 
the US allowed non-bank firms to take an important role in providing liquidity to 
the market. The failure to adequately regulate hedge funds and private equity 
funds by focussing on institutional characteristics rather than functional 
characteristics has allowed high concentrations of systemic and contagion risk to 
develop, with AIG being a clear example of this.106  
This has been recognised by the recent US Treasury Reform Proposal to 
provide the Federal Reserve with further powers and responsibility to oversee 
‘systemic risk’.107 The regulatory gaps in the US banking system also allowed 
non-bank lenders such as hedge funds to take an increasingly important role in 
providing liquidity by purchasing derivatives and other structured finance 
products. The significance of hedge funds and other participants in the so-called 
‘shadow banking system’ and the systemic risks they pose, has been recognised 
by the recent US Treasury reform proposals to increase oversight of systemic 
risks.108 
Another regulatory gap has been the perceived inconsistency of approach 
applied by regulators, central banks and government treasury departments in 
responding to the crisis. The best example is the differing treatment of Bear 
Stearns on the one hand, which the US government engineered a takeover as a 
bailout, and Lehman Brothers on the other, which the US government refused to 
rescue and that eventually entered bankruptcy.109  
 
F Globalisation of Capital Flows 
The globalisation of capital has been an integral part of the scale of the 
financial crisis.110 The globalisation or internationalisation of finance has both 
benefits and disadvantages for individual countries and their citizens. It can 
provide for access to global markets, thus reducing financing costs and allowing 
for business cycles to be smoothed, but it can also allow for the rapid 
                                                 
105  Emilios Avgouleas, ‘The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and Financial Regulation: In 
Search of a New Orthodoxy’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 23.  
106  Aaron Unterman, ‘Innovative Destruction – Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble 
Era’ (2009) 5 Hastings Business Law Journal 53. 
107  Department of Treasury, above n 62. 
108  These will include increasing the responsibility and powers of the Federal Reserve, the creation of a new 
Financial Services Oversight Council and increasing capital adequacy requirements for financial firms: 
ibid. 
109  Arner, above n 61, 113–5. 
110  See Garry Schinasi, Safeguarding Financial Stability – Theory and Practice (2006) 155–65 for an 
overview of the globalisation of finance process. 
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transmission of economic shocks between economies.111 Investors are able to 
purchase a wide variety of securities offered on various international markets, 
which has allowed the impact of the subprime crisis to spread around the world. 
It also allows for regulatory competition as financial institutions or investors 
move their operations and investments to jurisdictions they find favourable – 
whether that be because of the presence of the rule of law, the existence of 
transparency and good corporate governance or because regulation and its 
associated costs are minimised. Regulatory competition that results in 
jurisdictions with inadequate regulation can then create risks for other 
jurisdictions due to the interconnection of economies and markets.112 On the 
other hand, there is the incentive for jurisdictions having low levels of investor 
protection to increase their levels of regulation in order to encourage increasing 
capital inflows. 
The globalisation of capital flows also poses considerable regulatory 
challenges. The financial institutions at the centre of the financial crisis, such as 
AIG, UBS and Lehman Brothers all operate(d) across borders with each foreign 
subsidiary subject to different regulatory supervision. AIG, for example, 
undertook most of its controversial CDS transactions via its London office, but it 
was regulated as an insurance company in the US. The move to harmonise 
international financial laws has been discussed in various forums, including the 
G20. However, aside from supervisory cooperation through bodies such as 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (‘IOSCO’) and model law 
initiatives through United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(‘UNCITRAL’), it is difficult to achieve international consistency. The 
competitiveness of capital markets depends in part on the attractiveness of the 
legal regime for capital market regulation and investor protection. Proposed 
regulatory changes to US, UK or other capital markets are outside of the scope of 
this article.  
The factors discussed above did not individually cause the global financial 
crisis that has seen asset values and stock markets plummet, millions of jobs lost 
and large numbers of corporations collapse, even those once thought too big to 
fail. However, each of these factors played a part in turning rising US mortgage 
defaults into the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Having 
discussed the key events that have unfolded during the crisis so far and 
elucidated the underlying themes that generated, spread and prolonged the 
financial crisis, it is now important to understand what role the law has in the 
debate about the GFC’s causes and consequences. 
 
                                                 
111   Hal Scott, International Finance: Law and Regulation (2008) 14–5. Globalisation’s benefits are also not 
evenly spread across nations: see Ross Buckley, International Financial System – Policy and Regulation 
(2008) ch 2. 
112  ‘[The US] had a number of firms that took wild and unjustified risks, we had regulators that were asleep 
at the switch, and it has taken an enormous toll on the US economy and has spread to the world 
economy.’: Barack Obama, ‘News Conference by President Obama’ (Speech delivered at the ExCel 
Center, London, 2 April 2009).  
2009 How the American Dream Became a Global Nightmare 
 
371
IV LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CRISIS FOR AUSTRALIA 
Governments, regulators, advisers and researchers have debated the roles of 
the market, the political economy and the legal system in relation to what factors 
contribute to financial development and economic growth. The debate has 
included analysis of lack of regulation and over-regulation, legal rules compared 
to actual enforcement, and of public verses private enforcement.113 Findings have 
included that countries with poorer investor protection, measured by both the 
character of legal rules and the quality of legal enforcement, have smaller and 
narrower capital markets.114 However, law, markets and politics are continually 
evolving and impacting upon each other. Laws create incentives for particular 
types of behaviour; markets develop new financial products or services that are 
not subject to regulation and political views about how best to regulate can affect 
what laws are created and applied. The financial industry has argued that over-
regulation can lead to costs and a lack of international competitiveness.115 Indeed 
much of the past 25 years has been aimed at securing deregulation because of the 
efficiency of markets and meant that regulation could distort the market’s ability 
to allocate resources.116  
The GFC has seen a shift in the role envisaged for law as there has been a 
lack of regulatory oversight and a miscalculation of the costs of too little 
regulation. The prime examples are investment banks and derivatives,117 but 
banking and investor protection generally have also been criticised.118  
The GFC therefore calls for a fundamental rethinking about the appropriate 
levels and methods of regulation. Indeed, the last catalyst for large scale 
government regulation in the area of markets and securities was the Great 
Depression, suggesting that a similar opportunity exists now.119 Even one of the 
doyens of the Chicago School of Economics, Richard Posner, has stated: ‘The 
                                                 
113  See, eg, Rafael La Porta et al, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’, (1997) 52(3) Journal of Finance 
1131, 1149; John C Coffee Jr, ‘The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control’ (2001–2) 111 Yale Law Journal 1, 8–9; Bernard Black, ‘The Legal 
and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets’ (2000–1) 48 University of California at Los 
Angeles Law Review 781, 782–3; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 
‘What Works in Securities Laws?’, (2006) 61 Journal of Finance 1, 14, 20; John C Coffee Jr, ‘Law and 
the Market: The Impact of Enforcement’ (2007) 156(2) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 229. 
114  La Porta et al, ‘Legal Determinants’, above n 113, 1149; Rafael La Porta et al, ‘Law and Finance’, (1998) 
106(6) Journal of Political Economy 1113; World Bank, World Development Report 2002 – Building 
Institutions for Markets (September 2001). 
115  John C Coffee Jr, ‘Financial Crises 101: What can we learn from Scandals and Meltdowns – From Enron 
to Subprime?’ in R P Austin, The Credit Crunch and the Law (2008) 37; see also Robert C Ellickson, 
‘Taming Leviathan: Will the Centralizing Tide of the Twentieth Century Continue Into the Twenty-
First?’ (2000) 74 Southern California Law Review 101. 
116  Peter Cartwright, Banks, Consumers and Regulation (2004) 14–8. 
117  Cunningham and Zaring, above n 100. 
118  Brummer, above n 98.  
119  See, eg, Securities Act, 15 USC §§ 77a–77aa (1933); Securities Exchange Act, 15 USC §§ 78a–78lll 
(1934); Lawrence Friedman, A History of American Law (2nd ed, 1985) 658.  
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movement to deregulate the financial industry went too far by exaggerating the 
resilience – the self-healing powers – of laissez faire capitalism.’120  
Part IV of the article seeks to focus on key legal issues that the GFC has 
raised and to suggest reforms for better protecting the financial system and its 
investors. 
 
A Disclosure and Information Asymmetry 
The investment problems relating to information asymmetries, particularly 
with regard to complex derivative instruments, are discussed above. The legal 
dimension that is concerned with this issue is the adequacy of disclosure 
requirements in regulating these instruments. In Australian securities law, 
derivatives are generally classified as financial products for the purposes of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Chapter 7.121 However, the primary disclosure 
obligations of this classification do not necessarily resolve the problem of 
information asymmetries. This is because the products discussed above are often 
traded only between institutional investors and professional brokers and dealers, 
which means that the obligation to provide a product disclosure statement and 
statement of advice under Chapter 7 of the Act does not apply.122 In this situation 
it is more likely that general provisions prohibiting misleading or deceptive 
conduct in relation to financial services or to a financial product will apply.123  
While it seems clear that the disclosure obligations imposed on issuers and 
distributors of derivative instruments did not provide sufficient information to 
properly judge the risks associated with investing in these instruments, the 
problems of information asymmetry relate more to the complexity of the 
underlying instruments rather than defects in disclosed information. All 
investors, including large sophisticated institutions, should press the issuers of 
complex financial products to provide more comprehensible disclosure rather 
than wholly delegate this responsibility to gatekeepers such as CRAs (considered 
below). It could also be argued that government regulators could have done more 
to monitor information provided by product issuers, but with OTC markets it is 
exceedingly difficult to see how regulators such as ASIC or APRA could monitor 
the trading of private agreements. Regulatory gaps are bound to appear, 
particularly when those who are regulated have a vested interest in minimising 
transaction costs associated with regulatory burdens.  
                                                 
120  Richard Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ’08 and the Descent into Depression (2009) xii. 
121  It should be noted that the extensive regulatory gaps that exist for derivatives in the United States with no 
single regulator (neither the Commodity and Futures Trading Commission nor the Securities and 
Exchange Commission) having comprehensive responsibility has been addressed by US Treasury 
Department recommendations to harmonise the relationship between these two regulators to ensure 
comprehensive regulation of OTC derivatives: Department of Treasury, above n 62, ch II. 
122  There are some limited exceptions however, such as contracts for difference, which are a type of equity 
based derivative marketed heavily to retail investors and therefore require disclosure. See generally: Sally 
Palmer, ‘Contracts for Difference, Spread Bets and Over the Counter Derivatives: Through a Lawyer's 
Looking Glass’ (2007) 25(4) Company and Securities Law Journal 246. 
123  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1041H. 
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Thus the legal response to information asymmetries is not to simply mandate 
further disclosure, or to extend standard form disclosure documents to complex 
derivatives. Rather the legal responsibility rests on more effective enforcement of 
existing rules, minimising regulatory gaps, addressing pervasive conflicts of 
interest and promoting a more responsible approach by individual investors to 
understand the products they are investing in. One measure that has been 
suggested by a joint report from APRA, ASIC and the RBA is to increase 
industry standard form contracts for different types of commonly traded 
derivatives.124 The United States has also recently proposed that participants in 
derivatives trading should be required to maintain more extensive books and 
records and will be required to maintain stronger capital adequacy thresholds.125  
 
B Gatekeepers 
A gatekeeper is an outside or independent professional that is placed in a 
position whereby it can monitor or prevent wrongdoing.126 In the corporate 
context gatekeepers are seen as performing two related roles. First is the 
certification role. This definition views gatekeepers as reputational intermediaries 
who provide verification and certification services to investors.127 The 
gatekeeper fulfils its role because its reputational capital is at stake. The 
gatekeeper relies on repeat work that will only be forthcoming if its reputation 
remains intact and is seen as a reflection of quality and veracity. The second 
definition sees gatekeepers as restricting access to the market by securities 
issuers who do not conform to legal (and market) standards by withholding 
cooperation or consent.128  
Gatekeepers are desirable first because they overcome an investor’s inability 
to individually be able to afford the cost of monitoring an investment, second 
because they reduce agency costs and third because they can act as a form of 
investor protection.129 Corporations also benefit from gatekeepers because in 
reducing the risk to investors they also reduce the issuers’ cost of capital.130 In 
the context of the GFC gatekeepers became very important because disclosure 
alone was insufficient to deal with the complexity of financial instruments. When 
the gatekeeping function failed, investors who did not understand the underlying 
investment themselves were left unprotected. 
 
 
                                                 
124  APRA et al, above n 68; similar measures have been proposed in the US: Department of Treasury, above 
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125  Department of Treasury, above n 62. 
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1 Auditors 
The auditor is the classic example of a gatekeeper as it provides an audit 
report in relation to financial accounts that verifies their compliance with the 
law.131 A qualified audit report will alert shareholders to noncompliance and 
attract the attention of regulators.132 In Australia, an auditor is required to form 
an opinion and report to members concerning whether the financial report is in 
accordance with the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), including compliance with 
accounting standards and presenting a ‘true and fair view’.133 Auditors also have 
an ongoing duty to disclose to ASIC any contraventions of the Act.134 
The gatekeeper’s integrity was reinforced through the Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Act (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) 
(‘CLERP 9’) that was enacted in the wake of the Enron and HIH collapses to 
bolster independence. Division 3 of Part 2M.4 of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) sets out general requirements for auditor independence and specific 
relationships that will compromise auditor independence. The Act creates 
offences to promote the avoidance of a ‘conflict of interest situation’ between an 
auditor and the ‘audited body’. A conflict of interest situation is defined as 
existing when circumstances mean that: 
 the auditor is not capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment 
in relation to the conduct of the audit of the audited body; or 
 a reasonable person, with full knowledge of all relevant facts and 
circumstances, would conclude that the auditor is not capable of 
exercising objective and impartial judgment in relation to the conduct of 
the audit of the audited body. 
The specific independence requirements create offences aimed at prohibiting 
certain relationships between the auditor and audited body that are set out in 
section 324CH(1). Those relationships may be described as nine employment and 
ten financial relationships that compromise an auditor’s independence.135 
Despite the above requirements audit failure has been implicated in the GFC. 
The allegations have focused on incorrect classification of debt, valuation of 
financial instruments such as CDOs and MBS and valuation of loans. Indeed the 
auditor has been referred to as a potential defendant in relation to most corporate 
                                                 
131  Coffee, above n 126, 2; Black, above n 113, 784. 
132  Elizabeth Carson, Andrew Ferguson and Roger Simnett, ‘Australian Audit Reports’ (2006) 16(3) 
Australian Accounting Review 89, 92, 95. 
133  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 307–8; see also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 296–7, 304–5. 
134  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 311, 601HG; Michael Legg, ‘An Auditor’s Obligations to Report to 
ASIC – Between the Hammer and the Anvil’ (2005) 23 Company and Securities Law Journal 264. 
135  Michael Legg, ‘Auditor Independence and Criminal Liability Under CLERP’ 9 (2006) 34 Australian 
Business Law Review 156; see also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Div 5 of Pt 2M.4, which provides for 
auditor rotation; see also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 307C, which requires an auditor to provide a 
declaration of independence to the audited body. 
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collapses or major share price declines such as Centro and ABC Learning.136 The 
continuation of audit litigation raises two issues for consideration: whether 
further reforms are needed to enhance the gatekeeper role, and the ramifications 
of the litigation for society. 
A lack of independence in the above statutory terms has not yet been raised 
as a source of GFC-related litigation. However, independence in the broader 
sense of the auditor not viewing themselves as performing a public duty but 
rather seeing themselves as corporate advisers who can assist management so as 
to continue to earn audit fees may need further examination.137 Further liability 
of auditors is an oft-raised suggestion that is a double-edged sword, as discussed 
below. 
It remains to be seen whether the above allegations translate into findings of 
negligence or a search for a deep pocket. Legislation has been enacted to deter 
litigation aimed at deep pockets through the introduction of caps on liability and 
proportionate liability.138 The legislative reforms still allow for the continuation 
of litigation against auditors and so reflect a balance between: 
(a) reducing the extent of liability so as to ensure audit firm continuity that is 
essential to the functioning of corporate reporting and the capital 
markets; and  
(b) preserving the ability of private litigation to deliver compensation, 
provide deterrence and encourage audit quality as part of promoting 
investor confidence in corporate reporting and the capital markets.  
The problem with this domestic balance is that auditing is part of the global 
financial system so that the effectiveness of the balance may depend on how 
other countries deal with auditor liability.139 The GFC has highlighted this global 
connection with substantial lawsuits pending against auditors. In the United 
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States, the six largest auditing firms disclosed that prior to the GFC they were 
defendants in 90 actions with damage claims against the auditors in each case in 
excess of US$100 million.140 To these suits may be added claims against auditors 
in relation to the buy-out of Bear Stearns, the demise of AIG and failure of 
Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, and subprime lenders Countrywide and 
New Century.141  
The damages award that could flow from these cases could be of such a size 
as to exceed the total capital of an auditing firm. If a US law suit causes an audit 
firm to fail then Australia’s capital markets, corporations and investors may be 
impacted regardless of Australia’s liability regime. Auditor regulation is yet 
another area where a global response is required. 
 
2 Credit Rating Agency (‘CRA’) 
The CRA is also able to be viewed as a gatekeeper as the rating placed on a 
debt issue, MBS or CDO certifies the risk associated with that financial product 
to investors and without a rating the product could not be sold in the marketplace 
or only for a much reduced amount. In particular, securitisation would not have 
been as popular and could not have spread as easily throughout the global 
financial system without the imprimatur of CRAs. The world of structured 
finance involves complex products whose risks and cash flows are not easily 
ascertained because of the number of intermediaries involved and the detailed 
web of contractual rights and subordinated rights. Indeed, the more complex the 
product, the greater the reliance by both issuers and investors on the rating given 
because of the increased information asymmetries generated by opaque complex 
structures. 
It seems clear in hindsight that the rating agencies were unable to perform 
their gatekeeper role because they could not provide ratings that accurately 
predicted the risk of default. This may be explained by reference to several 
factors.142 First, the number of applications for ratings has increased 
exponentially in the last 20 years but the ratings agencies did not devote 
sufficient resources to assessing the quality of those applications.143 Second, 
ratings agencies are paid by the product issuers and other companies that seek 
ratings. This became problematic because a small number of investment banks 
produced the majority of structured finance issues so that the CRA became 
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beholden to these banks for a comparatively large portion of the profits earned by 
the ratings agencies.144  
The legal issues raised by CRAs centre on their relatively low levels of 
regulation and oversight and the perceptions of conflicts of interest and overall 
poor quality control with respect to rating complex products. CRAs have always 
had an important role in the US legal system with a wide range of statutes 
referring to ratings provided by a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization (‘NRSRO’).145 The US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(‘SEC’) had traditionally recognised NRSROs by issuing no-action letters after 
investigating particular CRAs. However, the passage of the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act 2006 (US) imposed stricter requirements on the SEC to provide 
formal rules relating to the recognition of NRSRO status that has now been 
completed with the release of final rules.146 The Obama administration has 
indicated that it requires greater disclosure of conflicts of interest and ratings 
methodologies to enable investors to reach their own conclusions about the 
efficacy of a rating. Further, regulatory reliance on credit ratings is to be 
reduced.147 These reforms have been labelled as a ‘missed opportunity’,148 and 
are critiqued further below in relation to conflicts of interest. 
In Australia, CRAs require an Australian Financial Services License 
(‘AFSL’) under Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), as their ratings 
advice would fall within the definition of providing a financial service. Holding 
an AFSL comes with a multitude of regulatory obligations, including conditions 
imposed on the license itself and ongoing burdens to maintain the license. 
However, ASIC has traditionally granted class order relief from these 
requirements for the three main global rating agencies (Moodys, Standard and 
Poor’s and Fitch Ratings), with the result that these agencies are not required to 
hold an AFSL.149 The class order relief from licensing is conditional on the 
ratings agencies complying with the IOSCO Code of Conduct for Credit Rating 
Agencies, which was introduced in 2003.150 The Code deals with issues such as 
quality assurance of credit ratings, maintaining independence and dealing with 
conflicts of interest. IOSCO released additional guidance on the code of conduct 
in 2004, which promotes public disclosure by ratings agencies of their internal 
codes of conduct. Failure to disclose the code of conduct would remove the class 
order relief granted by ASIC.  
On 11 November 2008, the then Minister for Superannuation and Corporate 
Law announced that the class order relief would be removed, bringing CRAs 
                                                 
144  Jerome S Fons ‘Testimony of Jerome S Fons Before the Committee on Oversight and Government 
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within Chapter 7 of the Act.151 This will therefore require CRAs to maintain an 
AFSL with conditions imposed by ASIC. CRAs will also be required to provide a 
compliance report with the IOSCO Code as a condition of their license. 
Requiring CRAs to maintain and AFSL will also impose the general obligations 
that apply to all AFSL holders including the obligation to:152 
 maintain adequate measures to deal with conflicts of interest153 
 maintain adequate resources to provide financial services; and 
 ensure that its representatives are adequately trained, and are competent, 
to provide the financial services specified in its license. 
Similar to the US reforms, there are questions as to whether the above 
changes go far enough in relation to a gatekeeper that was central to the GFC. 
 
3 Lawyers 
The lawyer is usually seen as owing professional, contractual, tortious and 
fiduciary duties to the client.154 Those duties involve all legal practitioners 
maintaining confidentiality and acting with loyalty and fidelity to their client’s 
interests within the bounds of the law.155 The lawyer must also maintain their 
independence.156 However, the lawyer has also been put forward as a potential 
gatekeeper that culminated in the United States with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 
2002 that required that a lawyer must engage in ‘up-the-ladder’ reporting, 
whereby an attorney must inform senior management of material violations and 
if management does not adequately respond, the lawyer must go up the corporate 
chain of command and inform the board of directors or one of its committees.157 
In the wake of the GFC the concept of lawyers as gatekeepers may need to be 
revisited. The role of lawyers in the GFC has arisen due to their documenting and 
advising on many of the financial instruments that allowed the risk of subprime 
mortgages to be disseminated amongst investors and in relation to misleading 
corporate disclosures about debt obligations. Whilst the criticism of lawyers in 
relation to the GFC has been primarily occurring in the US, recent developments 
in Australia suggest that Australian lawyers are not immune from having 
difficulty in identifying the client so that they seek to please management rather 
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156  G E Dal Pont, above n 155, 375–81; ‘Clients seek a lawyer’s guidance precisely because it is independent 
of the client’s interests and objective in its legal content’: Justice Gerard Brennan, ‘Pillars of Professional 
Practice: Functions and Standards’ (1987) 61(3) Australian Law Journal 112, 117. 
157  ‘Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society’ (2003–2004) 117 Harvard Law Review 2169. 
2009 How the American Dream Became a Global Nightmare 
 
379
than act in the best interests of the corporation and compromise their 
independence. 
In the long-running dispute over pay television, Seven Network News Ltd v 
News Ltd (also known as the C7 litigation) the actions of the General Counsel of 
News Ltd came under close scrutiny. The Court found that News Ltd’s General 
Counsel ‘gave the impression of a man who quite willingly subordinated his 
sense of ethics and propriety to a single-minded determination to advance the 
commercial interests of his employer.’158 
Similarly in the James Hardie case in which ASIC sought civil penalties 
against directors and officers, ASIC alleged that the General Counsel had 
breached his duty to exercise due care and diligence in failing to advise the board 
of directors that the draft ASX announcement that was prepared to comply with 
the company’s continuous disclosure requirements was false and misleading.159 
The Court held that the General Counsel had breached his duty of due care and 
diligence as an ‘officer’ of the corporation.160 Further, the Court opined that 
‘[g]uarding against legal risks to [the corporate entity] was at the core of ... 
responsibilities as general counsel.’161 
On one view the lawyer is merely the tradesman creating documents at their 
client’s behest and cannot be held responsible for misconceived views about risk 
or the conflicts of interest that drove the deals that handsomely rewarded 
executives and bankers but were harmful to investors and shareholders. Further, 
lawyers may not have the knowledge to be able to comprehend the full effect of 
certain accounting treatments or intricacies of a financial product. Another 
perspective is that lawyers exercising their duty of independence should tell 
would-be clients ‘they are damned fools and should stop’.162 The latter position 
may assume a prescience that many politicians and regulators did not have. 
Nonetheless the gravity of the GFC means that potential reforms should be 
examined. 
The first approach to reform would be to simply mirror the Sarbanes-Oxley 
reforms and create ‘up-the-ladder’ reporting obligations. This would reinforce to 
lawyers that their obligations are owed to the corporate entity and would 
empower the board of directors as they could expect improprieties known or 
suspected by the corporation’s lawyers to be brought to their attention. A board 
of directors may still not act but it would be at their own peril. 
The ‘up-the-ladder’ reporting obligations could be strengthened or weakened. 
A stronger reform would be to require lawyers to resign or terminate their 
representation if there was an inadequate response from the board of directors. 
An even more potent reform would be to impose specific external reporting 
                                                 
158  Seven Network News Ltd v News Ltd (2007) ATPR (Digest) 42–274, [422]. The Court’s finding was 
based on admitted dishonesty and the destruction of documents so as to hinder any potential suit for 
breach of confidentiality.  
159  ASIC v Macdonald (No 11) (2009) 256 ALR 199. 
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161  Ibid [394]. 
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obligations. This could include a duty to disclose to ASIC any contraventions of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that a lawyer has reasonable grounds to suspect. 
This would be similar to sections 311 and 601HG in relation to auditors.163 
Similar requirements have been adopted in relation to suspicious money transfers 
in Australia, Europe and Canada.164 A less strict approach would be to simply 
educate lawyers as to existing whistleblower legislation such as Part 9.4AAA of 
the Act.  
Reporting to an outside entity may serve to bring possible contraventions to 
light more quickly and thus act to dissuade illegal activities. However, external 
reporting runs contrary to the lawyers’ duties of confidentiality, loyalty and 
independence.165 There may also be a loss of legal professional privilege 
although privilege cannot be maintained in relation to illegal activities.166 There 
is therefore a question as to whether imposing external reporting obligations on 
lawyers would have a chilling effect on communications from a corporation’s 
managers to lawyers. However, in a highly regulated world it would be very 
difficult for a corporation to function without legal advice.167 
Alternatively, there could be the adoption of ‘demand side’ reforms, whereby 
there is a greater opportunity and incentive for the board of directors to obtain 
independent legal advice.168 A listed corporation could be required to have any 
corporate disclosures verified by external counsel, thus imposing an obligation 
on the lawyer to monitor corporate disclosures.169 This may be feasible in 
relation to annual or half-yearly reports, or a prospectus or product disclosure 
statement. However it may be too cumbersome for the continuous disclosure 
regime where legal advice is probably most needed, but difficult to obtain, when 
disclosure must be made ‘immediately’.170 
The lawyer as gatekeeper is a developing approach to corporate and securities 
regulation. The discussion above illustrates how it may be a practical response to 
the growth of corporations and the work of lawyers in relation to protecting the 
                                                 
163  See Michael Legg, ‘An Auditor’s Obligations to Report to ASIC – Between the Hammer and the Anvil’ 
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Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Bill 2006 (17 November 2006) [5]. 
166  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 125; J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (Online 2009) [25290]. 
167  Michael Legg, ‘Conflict Vests in Gatekeeper’s Role, The Australian Financial Review (Melbourne) 1 
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Villanova Law Review 1097, 1131–7. 
169  Coffee Jr, above n 126, 347–52. 
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3.1; ASX Guidance Note 8 (June 2005) [5]. 
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corporate entity and shareholders. However, it also has drawbacks such as 
fundamentally altering the role of the lawyer and potentially comprising the 
ability of a client to obtain much needed legal guidance. 
 
C Conflicts of Interest 
 
1 Defining Conflicts of Interest 
Conflict of interest may be defined broadly: (a) an incompatibility between 
the concerns or aims of different parties; (b) a situation whereby two or more of 
the interests held by, or entrusted to, a single person or party are considered 
incompatible.171  
A conflict of interest may also be defined more narrowly, by reference to a 
particular category of legal relationship.172 In the context of fiduciary 
relationships a conflict of interest may arise where, except with the informed 
consent of the principal, a fiduciary places himself or herself in a position where 
there is a real and sensible possibility of (a) a conflict between the duty as a 
fiduciary and his or her own interest (‘duty-interest conflict’) or (b) between the 
duty as a fiduciary to two or more persons (‘duty-duty conflict’).173  
This article employs the broader definition, but with the qualification that the 
main concern is where the incompatibility of aims or interests arises in a context 
where one party is holding itself out as being independent, or able to be relied on, 
or acting ‘for’ the other party.  
 
2 Conflicts of Interest Before the GFC 
Conflicts of interest in the business and financial sector have attracted 
significant attention prior to the GFC. The issue of conflicts first attracted 
substantial attention in 2001–2 when New York Attorney-General Eliot Spitzer 
commenced an investigation into the conflicts of interest facing research analysts 
at a number of investment banks. Enforcement actions resulted in the banks 
paying US$1.4 billion in penalties and disgorgement.174 The conflicts arose first 
because analysts recommended the purchase of securities to the public and to 
customers of their own firms without disclosing the fact that they owned those 
securities, second that their compensation was tied to their recommendations, 
                                                 
171  Oxford English Dictionary (Online Edition). 
172  See generally, Charles Hollander QC and Simon Salzedo, Conflicts of Interest (3rd ed, 2008). 
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and, third and most significantly, that their firms received compensation in the 
form of investment banking business from the issuer.175  
In Australia, the concern about conflicts of interest resulted in amendments to 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), with the insertion of section 912A(1)(aa), 
imposing an obligation to ‘have in place adequate arrangements for the 
management of conflicts of interest’ on all AFSL holders. ASIC issued Policy 
Statement 181 – Licensing: Managing Conflicts of Interest on 30 August 2004 
(‘PS 181’) that indicated that to comply with section 912A(1)(aa), arrangements 
to manage conflicts of interest must include arrangements to control, avoid and 
disclose conflicts of interest, as appropriate.176  
The issue of conflicts of interest and investment banks was brought to the 
fore in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global 
Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) (2007) 160 FCR 35 (‘ASIC v Citigroup’).177 In 
ASIC v Citigroup, a case that turned on the exclusion of any fiduciary duty 
between an investment bank and a client, Justice Jacobson in obiter rejected 
ASIC’s approach to the interpretation of section 912A(1)(aa) that some conflicts 
must be avoided as it was inconsistent with the plain meaning of the text.178 
Justice Jacobson reasoned that the section uses the word ‘management’, which 
does not require the elimination of a possible conflict, although one way of 
managing conflicts would be to eliminate them if a licensee chose to do so.179 
Further, ‘the phrase “management of conflicts of interest” assumes that there will 
be potential conflicts which must be managed by adequate arrangements rather 
than totally eliminated.’180  
The section 912A(1)(aa) approach can be contrasted with the regulatory 
approach adopted in relation to auditors where the conflict of interest from 
receiving substantial income through consulting and other services resulted in 
independence requirements that effectively banned such conflicts.  
 
3 The GFC and the Continuing Problem of Conflicts of Interest 
Conflicts of interest have been a major part of the behaviour that fuelled the 
GFC. In the subprime market the mortgage origination and distribution model 
meant that mortgage brokers were paid for originating a mortgage but did not 
bear the risk of the non-performance of that mortgage due to it being onsold. The 
mortgage broker had an incentive to maximise the number of loans that they 
                                                 
175  See Affidavit of Eric Dinallo in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law § 
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wrote which conflicted with the need to assure the quality of the mortgages 
which was in the best interests of the investor that purchased the MBS.181  
A further conflict was between individual bankers and the investment banks 
that they worked for in that their remuneration or bonuses were based on their 
being able to be rewarded for continuing to create, sell and underwrite financial 
products such as CDOs although the risk inherent in the CDO was borne by their 
employer or the shareholders in the investment bank.182  
The conflict created in investment banks may also be seen as a specific 
example of the more general situation in which executive remuneration is 
directed to short-term profitability rather than to long term success, with the 
result that  CEOs are ‘incentivised’ to take steps to maximise their wealth in the 
short term by maximising the corporate performance short-term even though that 
may involve significant risks that ultimately reduce or destroy shareholder wealth 
in the long term. There is therefore a conflict of interest created between the 
CEO’s interests and the shareholders’ or corporations’ interests.183  
These conflicts have seen a number of proposals for reform put forward with 
the common thread of aligning interests. Mortgage brokers would retain an 
interest in the mortgages they wrote, investment bankers and executives would 
receive bonus payments over time so as to encourage long term performance.184 
The issue of conflicts also permeates the problems experienced with 
gatekeepers. Most notably in relation to CRAs. A conflict of interest arose as the 
rating agency was paid by the issuer of the CDO or MBS who then used the 
rating to be able to market the financial product to investors. The CRAs 
remuneration and continued utilisation depended upon them providing 
sufficiently high ratings and thereby creating a conflict between their financial 
interest and the interest of investors who relied on the ratings.185 The CRA 
conflict has been addressed in Australia through bringing CRAs under the 
coverage of Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) as discussed above. 
In Australia the most prominent conflict of interest has related to financial 
advisers and consumers where the advisers is paid a commission by the provider 
of the financial product that they sell to the consumer. Examples include 
consumers who were advised to invest in Westpoint, Fincorp, Storm Financial, 
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Great Southern, Timbercorp and Opes Prime products – all of which failed.186 
The commission-based remuneration creates an incentive for the adviser to put 
consumers into products paying the best commissions rather than the products 
most suitable for the consumer.  
A particularly egregious example of potential conflicts of interest lay with 
Great Southern, which used a network of 1100 financial planners and accountants 
who were paid up-front fees of 10 cents for every dollar invested in Great 
Southern financial products. In relation to 337 of Great Southern’s authorised 
representatives it has been alleged that they were only authorised to sell Great 
Southern products so that there could not have been any assessment of whether a 
different product would have better suited an investor’s needs. Through this 
scheme Great Southern raised A$1.8 billion from 47,000 investors in five 
years.187 Great Southern was placed into administration on 18 May 2009.188 
Conflicts of interest in the financial sector have traditionally been addressed 
through disclosure189 and more recently through section 912A(1)(aa). The GFC 
suggests that both need to be revisited.  
The aim of disclosure is to allow the recipient of the advice to discount the 
advice to the extent it is influenced by the conflict.190 The act of disclosure may 
also reinforce the existence of the conflict and the need to counteract it, leading 
to greater honesty on the part of the advisor.191 Disclosure is favoured as a 
regulatory policy as it is the least intrusive way of addressing the conflict and it 
informs the recipient of the advice so that they can take the action appropriate to 
their situation.192 It is also acceptable to the individual or entity facing the 
conflict as they are not forbidden from acting and can reap the benefits that flow 
from the conflict – usually financial rewards.193 The disclosure solution also 
allows advisers to offer free or at least affordable advice to investors as the 
advisor is remunerated by the financial product provider.194 
The problems with disclosure are: (1) recipients of disclosure cannot utilise 
the disclosure effectively; and (2) the disclosure becomes routine or a 
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‘boilerplate’ clause in documentation that ceases to reinforce, or even 
undermines, the advisor’s obligations to the recipient.195 
A substantial body of cognitive psychology research has found that recipients 
do not correctly discount advice from biased sources. The recipient does not 
know if or how the conflict may affect the advice they receive. They only know 
that it might have an effect that they are not in the position to quantify. However, 
disclosure can also have a counterproductive result. A recipient having been 
warned of a conflict of interest may then put greater trust in the adviser because 
of their honesty. The advisor having disclosed the conflict may then feel that they 
have satisfied their obligation to the recipient and if the recipient relies on the 
conflicted advice they do so from an informed position.196 Significantly, these 
findings do not suggest that the recipient is uneducated or gullible, nor that the 
advisor is corrupt or fraudulent, only that both are human. 
Disclosure also allows conflicts to continue and does not effectively alleviate 
the underlying problem of tainted advice or actions.197 Some conflicts are so 
harmful that the conflict should be removed or banned. The independence 
requirements imposed on auditors after the Enron and HIH collapses are 
examples of certain identified conflicts of interest not being permitted through 
structuring relationships so that a conflict cannot arise.198 It should be noted that 
after ASIC v Citigroup, section 912(1)(aa) does not require the elimination of 
conflicts of interest, only that they be managed, presumably with disclosure 
playing a prominent role.  
The ramifications of the GFC suggest that some conflicts of interest may 
need to be structurally prevented. This is because in some cases they create such 
a mismatch of incentives and are so widespread that they create a systemic risk. 
The CRAs would be a prime example. Alternatively, in the Australian context the 
conflict that exists in relation to investment advice for superannuation may be too 
great a risk for a system of privately funded retirement. The need for affordable 
advice may mean that it needs to be provided by government or form part of a 
person’s superannuation benefits.199 
 
D Private Enforcement 
Traditionally the response to ‘mass wrongs’ is to rely on government 
regulation that may encompass both preventive measures and enforcement 
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measures.200 An alternative response to mass wrongs or group injuries, including 
securities fraud, misleading or deceptive conduct or nondisclosure is private 
enforcement, typically through the class action. 201  
Class actions (also known as group proceedings, collective actions or 
representative actions) can take many forms, however they may be generally 
defined as a legal procedure that enable the claims of a number of persons against 
the same defendant to be determined in the one suit.202 The grouping of claims 
allows for the costs of litigation to be shared and provides an incentive for a third 
party to fund the litigation. Shareholder class actions have been steadily 
increasing in Australia in response to a favourable legal framework.203 However 
the GFC, its spate of corporate collapses and share price declines have seen class 
action activity increase even further.204 The GFC’s stoking of class action 
activity in the highly regulated area of securities and financial products suggests 
that an assessment of public verses private enforcement is warranted.205 
Private enforcement through class actions is advocated on the basis that it 
promotes corporate governance and the efficiency of the market by allowing for 
the enforcement of statutory requirements such as continuous disclosure and 
prohibitions on misleading conduct.206 As contraventions are more likely to 
result in litigation and its related costs, corporations will take greater care not to 
contravene the law and will provide more reliable information to market 
participants.207 This in turn promotes investor confidence. Further, being able to 
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commence legal proceedings allows for compensation to those who have suffered 
loss or damage as a result of misconduct.208 
Private enforcement is not without its detractions. The advocacy of private 
enforcement necessarily assumes that public enforcement is not at an optimal 
level and that private enforcement does not result in over-regulation or over-
enforcement – matters that are hotly contested.209 The private litigant may also 
directly interfere with public enforcement. This is most clearly present in the case 
of the regulators attempts to encourage and protect the identity of whistleblowers. 
The class action promoters in seeking access to the fruits of a regulator’s 
investigation or enforcement action can dissuade potential whistleblowers from 
coming forward as their identity may be revealed or they may become the target 
of litigation.210 Equally, the regulator may find it more difficult to obtain 
cooperation or agreement to some form of settlement or fine when a much more 
expensive class action claim could follow. 
The private enforcer may also be unaccountable to the public, as argued by 
Callinan and Heydon JJ in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Limited v Fostif Pty 
Ltd, in which they observed that a litigation funder is not ‘“a generous spirited 
company who are trying to bring people to justice”. It has no public duties, nor is 
it held to public account, in the same way as an Attorney-General or other public 
servant.’211 Similarly, the analogy with the state or an administrative agency 
neglects the fact that the state provides disinterested administrative expertise as 
compared to the existence of self-interested class action promoters who often 
create the class action and have the most to gain from its prosecution or 
settlement.212 The management of conflicts of interest between class action 
promoters and the group members becomes an important issue in the efficacy of 
any class action.213  
The public verses private enforcement debate, while relevant to many areas 
of regulation, is particularly significant for both securities regulation and investor 
protection in light of the GFC, where government regulation failed.  
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E Global Regulatory Issues 
The GFC has provoked much soul searching and recommendations for 
reform in the United States.214 Australia, having not had its major financial 
institutions harmed to the same extent, has not sought to fundamentally re-work 
its ‘twin-peaks’ regulatory system – one regulator responsible for prudential 
regulation of relevant financial institutions (APRA), and another regulator 
responsible for business conduct and consumer protection (ASIC).215 However, 
markets are global so that national regulatory systems impact upon other nations. 
For example, the derivatives created by US investment banks found their way 
into the investment portfolios of local councils in Australia.216 
The US President Barack Obama, in seeking financial regulatory reform, 
commented: 
Finally, we must recognize that the challenges we face are not just American 
challenges, they are global challenges. So as we work to set high regulatory 
standards here in the United States, we have to challenge other countries around 
the world to do the same. That’s how we will stop financial crises from spilling 
across borders and prevent global crises of the sort that we now face.217 
The Obama Administration has accepted that financial stress can spread 
easily and quickly across national boundaries but that regulation takes place 
largely in a national context.218 Consequently, in addition to reforming its 
domestic structures, the US is seeking to improve international cooperation 
through supporting ‘supervisory colleges’ for significant cross-border firms, 
cross-border crisis management for dealing with failing firms and strengthening 
of international financial and banking organisations.219 These views were echoed 
by the Turner Report, issued by the Financial Services Authority in the UK.220 
For Australia, an active participation in global reform is essential as a means 
to protect the domestic financial system and domestic investors. 
 
V CONCLUSION  
The GFC has had a widespread impact on the world economy. Australia has 
not been spared the effect of the GFC although Australia has (so far) fared better 
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than most countries.221 Nonetheless the GFC has demonstrated that both global 
and domestic regulatory structures should be revisited. This article has sought to 
take the first steps in identifying the sources of the GFC through identifying the 
themes that gave rise to the nature and scope of the financial crisis.  It also puts 
forward some suggested reforms for consideration from an Australian 
perspective in the area of disclosure, gatekeepers, conflicts of interest, private 
enforcement and global regulatory cooperation.  Other areas such as corporate 
governance, executive remuneration, margin-lending, securities lending, short 
selling, insider trading and market manipulation which could not be addressed 
due to limits on space also require attention.222 
While this article necessarily focuses on the shortfalls of existing regulation 
and excesses of the marketplace, a balance must be struck between regulatory 
reform and efficient markets. Markets are essential to human development, 
including in countries such as Australia, as they afford not just economic 
advancement but the opportunity for personal well-being.223 Equally, the GFC 
demonstrates that regulation is needed to ensure that economic advancement and 
well-being are facilitated.  The zeal to reform must be accompanied by caution so 
as to ensure that the marketplace is not suffocated, innovation impeded, recovery 
retarded nor that unintended incentives are created that sow the seeds of future 
crises.  Regulation is back in vogue and people again appreciate the need for 
government. The opportunity to address the excesses must not be lost. However, 
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